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Abstract 
 
This paper looks into the differences in responses to corruption by foreign investors.  Statistical 
analysis highlights such differences for 17 major investing countries.   Those differences appear to 
be related to home countries’ own level of corruption, their size and experience in foreign invest-
ing. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
he question of how foreign investors from individual home countries respond to local corruption in the 
host market is certainly intriguing albeit not fully researched one.  On the one hand, recent studies con-
firmed the overall negative reaction to corruption (Wei, 2000, Drabek and Paine, 1999, Habib and Zu-
rawicki, 2002).  On the other, even intuitively it would be hard to expect that all the investors display 
the same degree of sensitivity.  Familiarity with the level of the characteristics of corruption in the tar-
get markets has been identified as a relevant factor affecting the foreign investors’ decisions according to Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2002. 
 
To date, there have been very few studies focusing on possible differences in the responses of foreign direct 
investors from individual countries to the corruption in target markets.  Academic articles which addressed this par-
ticular issue rather on the margin of the more general questions discussed, actually found no significant differences 
between the investors’ countries despite their varying legislature addressing foreign corruption (Hines, 1995, Wei, 
2000). 
 
However, while examining a similar issue with respect to the international trade, Lambsdorff (1998) con-
cluded that certain countries might have an advantage over others in the import markets perceived to be corrupt. 
This would imply that the taxing impact of corruption does not have to be uniform and ultimately is a function of, 
among other things, the exporters’ differentiated propensity to offer bribes.  
 
2.  Propositions 
 
The above findings motivated the authors to address anew the issue of how corruption affects the incoming 
foreign direct investments (FDI) originating in individual home countries.   In this paper, the following propositions 
were developed: 
 
P1.  All other things being equal, investors from countries perceived as relatively corrupt are less hampered by per-
ceived corruption in the home countries than the investors from countries perceived as relatively less corrupt. 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
T 
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P2.  All other things being equal, investors from countries which are latecomers to the FDI activities are less im-
peded by perceived corruption in the host countries than the investors from countries which established international 
presence early on. (as the re-investment accounts for a substantial portion of FDI). 
 
P3.  All other things being equal,  investors from larger countries are more sensitive to perceived corruption in the 
home countries than the investors from smaller countries.  This would reflect a greater absorption capacity for local 
investment in the large home countries.   
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
 
3.1.  Sample 
 
The study included the largest possible number of host countries in order to obtain a broader perspective on 
FDI and corruption. The statistics on aggregate bilateral FDI flows are analyzed in conjunction with key observa-
tional variables. Most data for the sample was obtained from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics 
Yearbook (OECD, 2000).  The bilateral flows of FDI between the largest investor-countries and the recipients of 
their FDI were recalculated in the US dollars for the three last years (1996-1998) for which the data was available.  
The following 17 home countries were included in the analysis: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the USA. The 
selection of home countries is meant to provide a fair representation of the Triad, while incorporating countries with 
markedly varying levels of Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the corruption measure produced by Transparency 
International.  This is very important, as based on the methodology applied by Transparency International, relatively 
small differences in CPI obtained for individual countries are not statistically significant. Depending on the home 
country, between 50 and 70 target host countries were identified for each of the 3 years. The home and the host 
countries considered represent the whole international spectrum, including developed and developing economies as 
well as the transition economies of Eastern Europe.  
 
3.2.  Measurements 
 
The OLS regression model was applied and ran separately for all the home countries--17 altogether. For 
each home country, two models are analyzed, both of them using the log of FDI as the dependent variable. FDI is 
the annual inflow of foreign direct investment from the home country to the host country. Log of FDI was used in 
the analysis to make the distributions nearly normal and the error term homoscedastic. The first model includes the 
control variables and CPI. The second model replaced CPI with the absolute difference in CPI. The key independent 
variables are corruption (corruption perception index or CPI) and absolute difference in corruption (Abs. Diff. in 
CPI) between the host and the home country. In this study, the corruption measure collected by Transparency Inter-
national (1999) is used and alternatively, a derived measure of the absolute difference in the perceived level of cor-
ruption between the home and the host countries was calculated by the authors.  
The key independent variables used in the regression—the same in Model 1 and 2—were selected based on the de-
terminants of FDI as suggested in the literature (Ensign, 1996). 
 
The majority of the results offer support for the propositions formulated earlier—refer to Table 1.  The ex-
istence of nuances in the general pattern uncovered is admissible in view of possible country-specific factors. Inte-
restingly, in many instances Model 1 and 2 rendered very similar results in terms of the value of the coefficients cha-
racterizing the impact of the perceived corruption level and the absolute difference in the perceived corruption levels 
upon foreign direct investment.  This could be due to the fact that on the average the home countries are perceived 
significantly less corrupt than the majority of the target countries.   
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal Volume 2, Number 1 
 11 
References 
 
1. Drabek, Z. & W. Payne. 1999. “The impact of transparency on foreign direct investment”. Staff Working 
Paper ERAD-99-02, Geneva, World Trade Organization. 
2. Ensign, P. 1996. “An examination of foreign direct investment theories and the multinational firm: A busi-
ness/economics perspective”. In M. Green & R. McNaughton, editors, The Location of Foreign Direct In-
vestment, Avebury: Aldershot. 
3. Habib,  and L. Zurawicki. 2002.  “Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment”, Journal of International 
Business Studies,   
4. Hines, J. 1995. “Forbidden payments: Foreign bribery and American business after 1977”. Working Paper 
5266, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. 
5. Lambsdorff, G. (1998). “An Empirical Investigation of Bribery in International Trade”.  European Journal 
of Development Research, 11 (1), 40-59. 
6. OECD. 2000. International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1999, Paris. 
7. TI. 1999. www.transparency.org/documents/cpi. 
8. Wei, S. 2000. “How taxing is corruption on international investors?” The Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 82(4): 1-12. 
9. Wheeler, D. & A. Mody. 1992. “International investment location decisions: The case of U.S. firms”. Jour-
nal of International Economics, 33: 57-76.  
 
Notes 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal Volume 2, Number 1 
 12 
Table 1. Regression coefficients for individual investor countries. 
 
  
Australia Austria Denmark Finland France 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 
-10.89* -5.773 -5025† 3.38 -4.044† -0.49 -10.747** -4.473 -9.312** -8.981** 
(5.136) (5.391) (3.578) (3.924) (2.171) (2.303) (3.543) (3.768) (3.698) (4.003) 
 Econ. Ties  
0.185* 0.168* 0.392*** 0.356*** 0.229** 0.229** -0.067 -0.067 0.088 0.124** 
(0.513) (0.505) (0.659) (0.657) (0.381) (0.38) (0.489) (0.486) (0.563) (0.571) 
 LogDist  
-0.051 -0.061 -0.111 -0.114 -0.248*** -0.249*** -0.289*** -0.288*** -0.328*** -0.337*** 
(1.004) (0.99) (0.555) (0.548) (0.394) (0.393) (0.468) (0.466) (0.517) (0.537) 
 LOGPOP  
0.283** 0.290** 0.205*** 0.160** 0.238*** 0.237*** 0.294*** 0.290*** 0.236*** 0.199*** 
(0.341) (0.332) (0.316) (0.307) (0.191) (0.191) (0.323) (0.32) (0.336) (0.335) 
 TRADE/GDP  
-0.075 -0.072 -0.009 -0.035 -0.08 -0.081 -0.094 -0.097† -0.122** -0.139** 
(0.516) (0.501) (0.365) (0.358) (0.214) (0.214) (0.366) (0.363) (0.386) (0.397) 
 Polit. Risk  
0.267* 0.195* -0.104 -0.057 0.185* 0.186* 0.329*** 0.325*** 0.326*** 0.515*** 
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023) 
 CPI  
0.314**  0.536***  0.370***  0.410***  0.302***  
(0.13)  (0.124)  (0.077)  (0.138)  (0.132)  
Abs. Dif CPI 
 -0.403**  -0.517***  -0.37  -0.416***  -0.053 
 (0.144)  (0.166)  (0.077)  (0.136)  (0.179) 
Adj. R2  0.303 0.323 0.553 0.564 0.263 0.623 0.619 0.622 0.658 0.629 
 N  161 161 170 170 166 166 158 158 172 173 
F 13.099*** 14.273*** 37.312*** 38.894*** 48.339*** 48.419*** 45.448*** 45.950*** 58.135*** 51.585*** 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
  
Germany Italy Japan Korea Netherlands 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 
-27.952*** -22.947*** -23.308*** -24.703*** -43.539*** -42.892*** -42.525*** -41.105*** -8.483** -3.841 
(3.706) (4.107) (3.279) (3.268) (6.975) (7.273) (6.305) (6.257) (3.775) (4.066) 
 Econ. Ties  
0.426*** 0.418*** 0.114† 0.130† 0.219** 0.230*** 0.325 0.303*** 0.127* 0.129* 
(0.693) (0.705) (0.517) (0.523) (0.768) (0.784) (0.777) (0.774) (0.563) (0.556) 
 LogDist  
-0.067 -0.067 -0.212*** -0.216*** 0.059 0.052 0.135† 0.107 -0.415*** -0.415*** 
(0.603) (0.611) (0.459) (0.473) (1.249) (1.281) (1.078) (1.076) (0.53) (0.526) 
 LOGPOP  
0.490*** 0.469*** 0.571*** 0.561*** 0.685*** 0.645*** 0.645*** 0.630*** 0.312*** 0.311*** 
(0.324) (0.323) (0.305) (0.305) (0.411) (0.412) (0.408) (0.401) (0.341) (0.336) 
 TRADE/GDP  
0.04 0.022 .106* 0.105† 0.162** 0.129* 0.059 0.056 -0.064 -0.067 
(0.403) (0.405) (0.357) (0.361) (0.446) (0.453) (0.414) (0.408) (0.383) (0.38) 
 Polit. Risk  
0.192** 0.234** 0.415*** 0.508*** 0.291** 0.468*** 0.304*** 0.359*** 0.288*** 0.265** 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.02) (0.031) (0.021) (0.027) (0.019) (0.029) (0.028) 
 CPI 
0.321***  0.145  0.260**  0.161*  0.240**  
(0.13)  (0.125)  (0.139)  (0.133)  (0.132)  
Abs. Dif CPI 
 -0.273***  0.043  -0.068  0.160**  -0.268** 
 (0.165)  (0.138)  (0.195)  (0.146)  (0.138) 
Adj. R2  0.686 0.677 0.581 0.575 0.553 0.553 0.588 0.599 0.643 0.648 
 N  170 170 171 170 180 180 158 158 169 169 
F 65.102*** 62.543*** 41.890*** 40.683*** 39.343*** 36.427*** 39.991*** 41.817*** 53.550*** 54.774*** 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
  
Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 
0.421 8.210** 4.45 8.999 -22.826*** -21.879*** -6.588* -0.0811 -5.018 -0.588 
(2.832) (3.086) (7.202) (7.191) (0.997) (3.723) (3.075) (3.371) (7.951) (8.191) 
 Econ. Ties  
0.264*** 0.250*** 0.02 -0.003 0.138 0.143** 0.215*** 0.212*** -0.06 -0.057 
(0.472) (0.478) (0.868) (0.831) (0.385) (0.391) (0.529) (0.529) (0.869) (0.891) 
 LogDist  
-0.334*** -0.358*** -0.408** -0.404** -0.229*** -0.227*** -0.275*** -0.279*** -0.260* -0.251* 
(0.507) (0.511) (1.304) (1.295) (0.52) (0.534) (0.468) (0.467) (0.724) (0.734) 
 LOGPOP  
0.252*** 0.239*** 0.188 0.121 0.623*** 0.592*** 0.229*** 0.227*** 0.132 0.1 
(0.255) (0.257) (0.665) (0.6) (0.322) (0.323) (0.284) (0.283) (0.74) (0.709) 
 TRADE/GDP  
-0.086† -0.102* -0.094 -0.133 0.157** 0.139* -0.179*** -0.181*** -0.161 -0.185** 
(0.288) (0.291) (0.653) (0.626) (0.366) (0.371) (0.319) (0.318) (0.69) (0.671) 
 Polit. Risk  
-0.088 -0.074 0.286† 0.291* 0.295** 0.423*** 0.228** 0.226** 0.375* 0.394** 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.047) (0.039) (0.027) (0.02) (0.026) (0.026) (0.053) (0.055) 
 CPI  
0.543***  0.088  0.232**  0.419***  0.267  
(0.097)  (0.22)  (0.123)  (0.113)  (0.249)  
Abs. Dif CPI 
 -0.519***  -0.118  -0.110†  -0.420***  -0.23 
 (0.106)  (0.284)  (0.178)  (0.113)  (0.293) 
Adj. R2  0.665 0.656 0.29 0.298 0.561 0.548 0.698 0.699 0.43 0.424 
 N  147 174 75 76 166 165 156 156 70 70 
F 60.460*** 58.093*** 6.527*** 6.800*** 37.364*** 35.611*** 63.430*** 63.670*** 10.550*** 10.339*** 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
  
UK US 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 
-33.473*** -24.067*** -4.811 -2.626 
(4.027) (4.49) (3.303) (3.647) 
 Econ. Ties  
0.237*** 0.256*** 0.106 0.094 
(0.515) (0.508) (0.404) (0.411) 
 LogDist  
0.044 0.057 -0.111 -0.121 
(0.515) (0.527) (0.743) (0.753) 
 LOGPOP  
0.573*** 0.542*** 0.571*** 0.553*** 
(0.364) (0.358) (0.253) (0.252) 
 TRADE/GDP  
0.041 0.026 0.206** 0.193*** 
(0.429) (0.43) (0.269) (0.269) 
 Polit. Risk  
0.112 0.11 0.112 0.161 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.02) (0.019) 
 CPI_  
0.487***  0.276*  
(0.16)  (0.092)  
Abs. Dif CPI 
 -0.478***  -0.224* 
 (0.178)  (0.131) 
Adj. R2  0.618 0.615 0.276 0.27 
 N  157 156 159 158 
F 45.008*** 44.201*** 11.496*** 11.131*** 
Standardized regression coefficients are reported; standard errors are in parenthesis  
†  p < 0.10, * p <  0.05,  ** p <  0.01,  *** p <  0.001 
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Notes 
